In this paper we characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate along with additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. Moreover, new characterizations of the well known rules based on the principles of "equal award", "equal loss", and "proportionality" are provided using these additivity properties.
Introduction
Many economic situations can be modelled as a problem of how to divide a resource among agents who have claims on it. In this paper we study problems where an estate E must be divided among a finite group of agents N, c i being the claim of agent i.
We study four kinds of problems that differ in the way an estate must be divided. In bankruptcy problems (introduced by O'Neill (1982) and studied later by Aumann and Maschler (1985) ) an agent must receive at least 0 and at most his claim. In allocation problems (Chun (1988) and Herrero, Maschler, and Villar (1999) ) agents can receive anything. In surplus problems (Moulin (1987) ) every agent must receive at least 0. In loss problems, defined in this paper, every agent must receive at most his claim. Notice that with the four classes of problems we cover all the possibilities.
One of the most important topics of these problems is the axiomatic characterizations of rules. The idea is to propose desirable properties and find out which of them characterize every rule. Properties often help agents to compare different rules and to decide which rule is preferred for a particular situation. Thomson (2003) and Moulin (2002) give a survey of this literature.
A dual approach is to study what the rules satisfying a set of properties are. For instance, Young (1988) characterizes the rules satisfying continuity, symmetry, and consistency; de Frutos (1999) characterizes the rules satisfying non-manipulability; and Moulin (2000) characterizes the rules satisfying consistency, composition up, composition down, and scale invariance.
In this paper we adopt both approaches. We characterize the rules satisfying additivity in each of the four problems mentioned above. Moreover, using these additivity properties, we characterize the well-known rules based on the principles of "proportionality", "equal award", and "equal loss".
Additivity is a standard property. It has been used in many situations. Although the justification of additivity is not as clear as with other properties (for example, efficiency or symmetry), in most cases it produces very interesting classes of rules. For instance, the Shapley value, the most important value in cooperative games with transferable utility, is characterized by additivity and other properties. If we compare the Shapley value with other prominent values (for example the nucleolus) we realize that these values satisfy all the properties characterizing the Shapley value except additivity.
In this paper we use two definitions of additivity: additivity on the estate (Moulin (1987) and Chun (1988) ), called A1, and additivity on the estate and the claims (Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya (2001) ), called A2. In the four kinds of problems we characterize the rules satisfying A1 and A2.
The rules satisfying A1 are as follows. In allocation problems they are characterized by the product of the estate and a claims-depending function. In surplus problems the estate is divided among agents according to a weight system, which depends on the claims. In loss and bankruptcy problems only the proportional rule satisfies A1.
The rules satisfying A2 are as follows. In allocation problems they are characterized by the sum of two parts: one depending on the estate and the other depending on the claims. In surplus (loss) problems the estate (loss) is divided among agents according to a weight system, independent of the claims. There is no bankruptcy rule satisfying A2.
We obtain axiomatic characterizations of well-known rules. In allocation problems and surplus problems, the proportional rule is characterized by A1 and other properties. In allocation and loss problems, the rights-egalitarian rule (Herrero et al. (1999) ) is characterized by A2 and other properties. Moreover, A2 and other properties also characterize the equal-sharing rule (Moulin (1987) ) in surplus problems.
As a consequence of our results we can say that additivity properties also support the use of rules based on the three classical principles. A1 is related to the principle of "proportionality"; A2 is related to the principles of "equal award" and "equal loss".
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the problems studied in this paper. In Section 3 we characterize the rules satisfying A1 and A2. In Section 4 we characterize well-known rules using these additivity properties. Section 5 is devoted to concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
We introduce some notation. Z denotes the set of integer numbers and N denotes the set of non-negative integer numbers. Q denotes the set of rational numbers and Q + denotes the set of non-negative rational numbers. R denotes the set of real numbers and R + the set of non-negative real numbers.
N also denotes the set of potential agents. Let N be any finite subset of N. Given x, y ∈ R N , x ≥ y means x i ≥ y i for all i ∈ N ; x + y = (x i + y i ) i∈N .
Moreover, 0 N = (0, ..., 0) ∈ R N . Given S ⊂ N, 1 S = (x i ) i∈N such that x i = 1 if i ∈ S and x i = 0 if i / ∈ S. We study problems where an estate E must be divided among a group of agents N, c i being the claim of agent i ∈ N, c = (c i ) i∈N the vector of claims, and C = P i∈N c i the sum of the claims. We assume that the estate and the claims are non-negative real numbers, i. e. (c, E) ∈ R N + × R + . The question that arises is: how to divide the estate among agents? This question is answered by means of defining rules. A rule, f , is a map which assigns to any problem (c, E) a vector f (c, E) where f i (c, E) denotes the part of the estate received by agent i ∈ N.
We now give a list of problems that fit in our general framework. Notice that the difference among these problems is, mainly, in the definition of what a rule is.
A bankruptcy problem, BP , is a pair (c, E) ∈ R N + × R + where C ≥ E. We denote by B the set of all bankruptcy problems. A bankruptcy rule is a function
A surplus problem, SP , is a pair (c, E) ∈ R N + × R + . We denote by S the set of all surplus problems. A surplus rule is a function
An allocation problem, AP , is a pair (c, E) ∈ R N + × R + . We denote by A the set of all allocation problems. An allocation rule is a function f A : A → R N satisfying that for all (c, E) ∈ A, P i∈N f A i (c, E) = E. These problems have been studied in the literature. For instance, O'Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985) studied bankruptcy problems, Moulin (1987) studied surplus problems, and Chun (1988) and Herrero et al. (1999) studied allocation problems 1 . See Thomson (2003) and Moulin (2002) for a survey of this literature.
As far as we know the next class of problems has not been studied explicitly. A loss problem, LP , is a pair (c,
Remark 1. These four kinds of problems cover all possible definitions of a rule. Given i ∈ N, a bankruptcy rule satisfies 0 ≤ f
, and an allocation rule has no restrictions at all. Notice that any bankruptcy rule is a loss rule and any surplus rule is an allocation rule. Herrero et al. (1999) consider the case where E < 0. It is easy to check that our results are also valid if we allow the estate to be negative in AP and LP.
In BP and LP we need to impose the condition C ≥ E because otherwise it is not possible to find f satisfying P i∈N
We now present some rules studied in this paper. The proportional rule, P , divides the estate proportionally to the claims when their sum C is different from zero. Formally, for all i ∈ N, c 6 = 0 N ,
Remark 2. It is easy to check that the results obtained in this paper are also true if we define P (0 N , E) in a different way.
Assume that c = 0 N and (c, E) is a BP or a LP. Since C ≥ E ≥ 0, we conclude that E = 0. Then, any bankruptcy rule or loss rule satisfies
The equal-sharing rule, ES, divides the estate equally among agents. Formally, for all i ∈ N,
Notice that the equal-sharing rule is both an allocation rule and a surplus rule. Nevertheless, it is not a bankruptcy rule or a loss rule because ES i (c, E) could be larger than c i .
We present a family of rules closely related to ES. We denote ω as a weight system if ω ∈ R N + and
The weighted-sharing rule WS ω with weight system ω is defined for all
ω is an allocation rule and a surplus rule but not a bankruptcy rule or a loss rule. Of course, if Herrero et al. (1999) define the rights-egalitarian rule, RE, for all i ∈ N as
Notice that the rights-egalitarian rule is an allocation rule and a loss rule (in LP, C ≥ E). Nevertheless, it is not a bankruptcy rule or a surplus rule because RE i (c, E) could be negative. We present other rules closely related to RE. The weighted-rights rule W R ω with weight system ω is defined for all i ∈ N as
Notice that W R ω is an allocation rule and a loss rule but not a bankruptcy rule or a surplus rule. Of course, if
We now present some properties used in this paper. First, we introduce the two additivity properties considered in this paper.
Additivity on E (A1). For all (c, E) and (c, E 0 ),
Moulin (1987) and Chun (1988) used this property in surplus problems and in allocation problems, respectively. A1 indicates that to divide the estate among the agents is the same as dividing, first, one part of the estate, and afterwards, the remaining estate.
Additivity on (c,E) (A2). For all (c, E) and (c 0 , E 0 ),
Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya (2001) introduced this property in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems. Suppose that the product sold by a firm depends on several parts (quality and marketing, for instance). The total revenue of the firm, E+E 0 , can be divided into two parts: one motivated by quality (E) and the other by marketing (E 0 ). We can also determine the contribution of every agent of the firm to quality (c) and marketing (c 0 ). Now we can allocate the revenue according to two procedures. First, we allocate the total revenue (E +E 0 ) according to the total contribution (c+c 0 ). Second, we allocate the revenue motivated by quality (E) according to the contribution to quality (c), and the revenue of marketing (E 0 ) according to the contribution to marketing (c 0 ). A2 guarantees that both procedures coincide.
Usually it is not very difficult to determine the contribution of the agents to each part (for instance, hours worked) and to the total revenue. But sometimes it seems impossible to know exactly the contribution of each part to the total revenue. Under these circumstances it appears that the second procedure cannot be applied. However, if the allocation rule satisfies A2, its application is possible since both procedures coincide.
There is no relation between A1 and A2. Later, we will see examples of rules satisfying A1 but not A2 and rules satisfying A2 but not A1.
More properties will now be considered. Symmetry and continuity are standard properties that could be defined in each of the four problems studied in this paper.
Continuity on E (CONT). For all sequences of problems
. Suppose that the estate, E, is equal to the sum of the claims, C. Compatibility denotes that each agent gets exactly the amount he claims.
Compatibility (COM). For all problems (c, C) , f (c, C) = c. The next property appeared in a preliminary draft of Herrero et al. (1999) , but not in the final version. Condition i) says that no agent gets less than he has a right to. Condition ii) says that no agent gets more than he claims.
Claims Boundedness (CB). For all (c, E) ∈ A:
Notice that all bankruptcy rules and loss rules satisfy CB.
Additive rules
In this section we characterize the set of additive rules in the four problems.
In Theorem 1 we characterize the rules satisfying A1 and in Theorem 2 the rules satisfying A2. Proof. a) It is trivial to prove that any function given by f A (c, E) = Eα (c) satisfies A1 and CONT .
We now prove the converse. Assume that f A is an allocation rule satisfying A1 and CONT. Since f A satisfies A1 we conclude that:
• f A (c, E) = Ef A (c, 1) for all E ∈ N.
• If E = 1 q , where q ∈ N, then f A (c, E) = Ef A (c, 1).
•
A (c, 1) the result holds. b) It is trivial to prove that any function given by f S (c, E) = Eω (c) satisfies A1.
We now prove the converse. Assume that f S is a surplus rule satisfying A1. Using arguments similar to those used in part a) we can conclude that given E ∈ Q + , f S (c, E) = Ef S (c, 1) . Let E be a non-negative irrational number (E ∈ R + \ Q + ). Then, there exists
such that E l ∈ Q + , 0 < E l < E, and lim
Thus, for all i ∈ N,
So, for all i ∈ N,
Hence, f S (c, E) = Ef S (c, 1) for all (c, E) ∈ S. If we take ω (c) = f S (c, 1) the result holds. c) It is trivial to prove that the proportional rule satisfies A1. We now prove the converse. Assume that f L is a loss rule satisfying A1.
Using arguments similar to those used in part a) we can conclude that, given c ∈ R
Given (c, εE) ∈ L with E a non-negative irrational number, there exists
Thus, for all l ∈ N,
We know that,
d) Since every bankruptcy rule is a loss rule, part d) is an immediate consequence of c).
¥ Remark 3. For n > 1, condition CONT in a) is needed to avoid an infinite family of meaningless solutions. Let ¡ B l ¢ l∈L be a Hamel basis of R as vector space over Q with B l > 0 for all l ∈ L (see, for instance, Aczél and Dhombres (1989) for a detailed explanation).
We define f A as follows. Given E ∈ R + , there exists a unique {q 1 , ..., q m } ⊂ Q and
is well-defined, it satisfies A1, and P i∈N f A i (c, E) = E for all E ∈ R + . However, by choosing an appropriate function γ, it is not of the form f A (c, E) = Eα (c). For example, given l 0 ∈ L, we define γ as follows:
The associated function f A is an allocation rule satisfying A1. However, it cannot be written as f A (c, E) = Eα (c).
Chun ( It is straightforward to prove that an allocation rule f A satisfies A1, CONT, and SY M if and only if for all (c, E) ∈ A, f A (c, E) = Eα (c) where
Notice that in part d) we obtain a new characterization of the proportional bankruptcy rule. Also, the proportional loss rule can be characterized as the only loss rule satisfying A1.
The next theorem characterizes the rules satisfying A2. We now prove the converse. Since f A satisfies A2 we conclude that
. Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 a) we can conclude that f A (0 N , E) = Ef A (0 N , 1) for all E ∈ R + . If we define β (c) = f A (c, 0) and x = f A (0 N , 1), the result holds.
b) It is trivial to prove that every weighted-sharing rule W S ω satisfies A2.
We now prove the converse. Assume that f S is a surplus rule satisfying A2.
Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 b) we can conclude that given E ∈ R + , f S (0 N , E) = Ef S (0 N , 1) . If we define β (c) = f S (c, 0) and x = f S (0 N , 1), every surplus rule has the form given in part a). Since f
is easy to prove that f S = W S ω where ω = f S (0 N , 1) is a weight system. c) It is trivial to prove that every weighted-rights rule W R ω satisfies A2. We now prove the converse. Assume that f L is a loss rule satisfying A2. We first prove that for all i ∈ N and
Using arguments similar to those used in Theorem 1 a) we can conclude that given x ∈ Q + and i ∈ N,
Let x be a non-negative irrational number. Then, there exists
such that x l ∈ Q + , 0 < x l < x, and lim
Then, y i = y j . Given i ∈ N we define ω = y i . It is trivial to see that ω is a weight system. We now prove that
, and c = (7, 7). We can find i ∈ N such that f If we compare the rules satisfying A1 (Theorem 1) with the rules satisfying A2 (Theorem 2) in the four kinds of problems we obtain the following:
In AP both classes of rules are unrelated. Moreover, an allocation rule f A satisfies A1, A2, and CONT if and only if for all (c, E) ∈ A, f A (c, E) = Ex where x ∈ R N and P i∈N x i = 1.
In SP the class of rules satisfying A2 is a subset of the class of rules satisfying A1 (just take ω (c) = ω for all c).
In LP the proportional rule, the only rule satisfying A1, does not satisfy A2. Moreover, the weighted-rights rules, which satisfy A2, do not satisfy A1.
In BP the proportional rule, the only rule satisfying A1, does not satisfy A2.
Characterizations of classical rules
In this section we characterize the three classical rules based on the principles of "proportionality", "equal award", and "equal loss" using the additivity properties.
In Theorem 2 part c) we characterize the class of weighted-rights rules in LP . Notice that the weighted-rights rules also satisfy A2 and CONT in AP (take β i (c) = c i − ω i C and x i = ω i for all i ∈ N). Nevertheless, there are more allocation rules satisfying both properties. The next proposition characterizes the weighted-rights allocation rules as the only allocation rules satisfying A2 and CB.
Proposition 1. An allocation rule f
A satisfies A2 and CB if and only if f
A is a weighted-rights rule W R ω for some weight system ω.
Proof. If ω is a weight system it is straightforward to prove that W R w satisfies A2 and CB. We now prove the converse. Let f A be an allocation rule satisfying both properties. We define ω as f A (0 N , 1). Since f A satisfies CB we conclude that ω is a weight system.
Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 b) we conclude that for all E ∈ R + , f
The case E > C is similar to the case E ≤ C. ¥
We now prove that this proposition is a tight characterization result. ES satisfies A2 but not CB. Given (c, E) ∈ A and i ∈ N, we define the allocation rule ψ as
In Theorem 1, parts c) and d), we characterize the proportional rule in LP and BP as the only rule satisfying A1. Nevertheless, in AP and in SP there are more rules satisfying these two properties. The next corollary shows that if we add COM to A1 and CONT (A1), the proportional rule becomes the only rule satisfying these properties in AP (SP ). In this corollary we assume that C > 0 3 . Corollary 1. a) The proportional rule is the only allocation rule satisfying A1, CONT and COM.
b) The proportional rule is the only surplus rule satisfying A1 and COM.
Proof. a) Of course the proportional rule satisfies A1, CONT and COM. Let f A be an allocation rule satisfying these properties. It is trivial to see that Theorem 1 a) is also true if we restrict to the case C > 0. Then, we conclude that for any (c, E) ∈ A, f A (c, E) = Eα (c) where
It is similar to the proof of part a). ¥ Corollary 1 a) is a tight characterization result. RE satisfies CONT and COM but not A1. Because of Remark 3 there exist rules satisfying A1 and COM but not CONT. We take the same example but with the function γ defined as follows:
Finally, ES satisfies A1 and CONT but not COM. Corollary 1 b) is a tight characterization result. ES satisfies A1 but not COM. The surplus rule ϕ defined as ϕ i (c, E) = max {0, c i + β} where P i∈N ϕ i (c, E) = E satisfies COM but not A1.
3 In the general case (C ≥ 0) we will obtain that there exist many rules satisfying these properties. Nevertheless, all of them satisfy f (c, E) = E C c when C > 0. Moulin (1987) characterizes in his Theorem 2 the proportional surplus rule using A1 and other properties. These properties are completely different from COM used in part b) of Corollary 1.
Part a) of Corollary 1 is closely related to Theorem 5 in Chun (1988) where he proved that the proportional rule is the only allocation rule satisfying A1, CONT * , and COM 4 . In our result we change CONT * to CONT (CONT is weaker than CONT * ). Then, Chun's characterization of the proportional rule is also true only with continuity on the estate.
In Theorem 2 parts b) and c) and in Proposition 1 we characterize the class of weighted-sharing rules and weighted-rights rules in AP , SP , and LP using A2 and other properties. Unfortunately, in BP there are no rules satisfying A2. The next corollary shows that if we add SY M to the properties used in Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 we can characterize the equal-sharing rule in SP and the rights-egalitarian rule in AP and LP .
Corollary 2. a) The rights-egalitarian rule is the only allocation rule satisfying A2, CB, and SY M.
b) The equal-sharing rule is the only surplus rule satisfying A2 and SY M.
c) The rights-egalitarian rule is the only loss rule satisfying A2 and SY M.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of Corollary 1. ¥ It is not difficult to check that Corollary 2 is a tight characterization result.
Since CB implies COM and RE satisfies CB, part a) of Corollary 2 can be obtained also as a consequence of Proposition 3 in Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya (2001) , where they proved that RE is the only allocation rule satisfying A2, COM, and SY M. Moulin (1987) characterizes in his Theorem 2 the equal-sharing surplus rule using several properties, which are different from the properties used in part b) of Corollary 2. Nevertheless, Moulin (1987) and we use an additivity property, Moulin uses A1 and we use A2.
Concluding Remarks
The results obtained in Section 3 can be summarized in the following Table: (Insert Table 1 here)
The results obtained in Section 4 can be summarized in the following Table: (Insert Table 2 here)
With A1 and other properties we characterize the proportional rule in each of the four problems. With A2 and other properties we characterize the "egalitarian" rules, the equal-sharing rule in surplus problems and the rights-egalitarian rule in loss and allocation problems. This suggests that additivity properties support the use of rules based on the three classical principles: A1 supports the principle of "proportionality", and A2 supports the principles of "equal award" and "equal loss". 
